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A. INTRODUCTION 
 Section 4 (1) (a) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 states 
that it is an offence for any person to hold another person in servitude or slavery.1 In February 
2018, John Miller and Robert McPhee appeared at the High Court in Glasgow, charged on 
indictment with this offence.2 The co-accused were duly convicted of the charge of holding 
another person in servitude (inter alia), but the initial libel of ‘slavery’ was removed, by the 
trial judge, from the jury’s consideration.3 In defining both ‘servitude’ and ‘slavery’, the court 
was obliged, per s.4 (2) of the 2015 Act, to have due regard to the understanding of these terms 
which has evolved out of the jurisprudence of Article 4 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).4 ‘Slavery’, then, was said to denote ‘the status or condition of a person over 
whom any or all of the powers attaching to the rights of ownership are exercised’.5 Thus, it was 
concluded that ‘the definition of slavery involves … rights of ownership’6 and that, as a result 
of this, ‘there was no evidence upon which they could hold that the complainer had been held 
in a state of slavery’.7 
 If, however, the definition of ‘slavery’ must be understood as necessarily involving the 
‘powers’ arising from ‘rights of ownership’ – that is, in the Scottish context, a legal relationship 
of dominium between the owner and the slave8 giving rise to powers of disposal, use and abuse 
of the ‘thing’ owned, as well as legal claims to the fruits produced by the labour of the ‘thing’9 
– it is difficult to see how any private individual can actually commit the offence of holding 
                                                          
1 The wording of this section is identical to s.47 (1) (a) of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 
(now repealed). 
2 See Miller v HM Advocate [2019] HCJAC 7 
3 Miller, para.1 
4 Miller, para.8; Article 4 (1) of the ECHR posits that ‘no one shall be held in slavery or servitude’. 
5 Miller, para.8; the wording of this definition is taken from Article 1 of the Convention on Slavery, March 9 th 
1927, 60 L.N.T.S 253. This definition is the ‘classic’ definition of slavery, approved of by the European Court of 
Human Rights per Siliadin v France (Application no. 73316/01) 26/10/2005, para.122. As indicated by that court 
in M and Others v Italy and Bulgaria (2013) 57 EHRR 29, para 149, for a human being to be a ‘slave’ within the 
meaning of Article 4 of the ECHR, they must be ‘reduce[d] to an object’ over which a ‘genuine right of ownership’ 
is exercised by another. 
6 Miller, para.8 
7 Miller, para.9 
8 ‘Dominium’, or ‘ownership’, being ‘the sovereign or primary real right’: See Erskine, Institute, 2, 1, 1. Scots 
property law – to the ‘surprise’ of Lord Hobhouse as recorded in the case of Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger 2004 
S.C. (H.L.) 19 – ‘is still [in the 21st century] based on the judicial development, albeit sophisticated, of the laws 
of Rome’, hence the later importance of Roman law to the development of this article. 
9 See (e.g.,) Alves v Alves (1861), 23, D. 712 and David L. Carey Miller and David Irvine, Corporeal Moveables 
in Scots Law, (W. Green and Sons, 2005) para.1.12 
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another person as a slave within the context of the 2015 Act.10 Historically, Scots law has 
refused to countenance the institution of slavery.11 As early as 1687, in the case of Reid v Scot 
of Harden and his Lady,12 the Court of Session held that ‘we have no slaves in Scotland, and 
mothers cannot sell their bairns’. Though this juridical pronouncement was seemingly 
forgotten in practice for much of the 18th century,13 in the 1778 case of Knight v Wedderburn14 
it was firmly15 established that Scots law did not recognise the lawfulness of slavery as an 
institution.16 If the law does not recognise that it is possible for one human being to own another 
– and Scots law has certainly not recognised this for centuries, if it ever formally did17 – and if 
the definition of slavery necessarily ‘involves rights of ownership’,18 then it follows that any 
enactment of law specifically proscribing slavery is nugatory.19 
 This article consequently asks whether or not in passing s.4 (1) (a) of the 2015 Act (and 
thus its predecessor, s.47 (1) (a) of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010) 
Parliament criminalised an impossible action. In answering this question, this article considers 
the significance that conferring the status of ‘person’ upon an entity has, as a matter of law, 
and assesses the extent to which there can be said to be a legal binary between ‘persons’ and 
                                                          
10 This is not so because, as some contend, we should not elevate ‘one of the ugliest of human perversities, slavery, 
to the status of “law”’ as slavery is not and cannot be a legal relationship (see Jeremy M. Miller’s review of Alan 
Watson’s Roman Slave Law, [1988] Legal Stud. F. 389, pp.389-391), but rather because the law as it presently 
stands in Scotland does not elevate the ‘perversity’ of ‘slavery’ to the status of ‘law’.   
11 Although it is said here that Scots law refused to countenance the institution of slavery, it is plain that the 
Scottish nation and people did ‘vigorously’ engage in – and ‘benefit’ from – colonial slavery. Throughout the 
eighteenth century, slaves from the colonies were routinely brought to the shores of Scotland – and thus nominally 
brought under the jurisdiction of Scots law – without undergoing any practical change in status: See John W. 
Cairns, Stoicism, Slavery and Law: Grotian Jurisprudence and its Reception, [2001] Grotiana, pp.216-217  
12 (1687) Mor. 9505 
13 See, e.g., the controversy surrounding cases such as Sheddan v a Negro (1757) Mor. 14545, Stewart Nicholson 
v Stewart Nicholson (1771) and Spens v Dalrymple (1770), each of which concerned purported ‘slaves’ acquired 
in British colonies and each of which were seen as giving rise to sufficiently complex legal issues so as to merit 
litigation and debate in spite of the ruling in Reid. 
14 (1788) Mor. 14545 
15 See the discussion in John W. Cairns, John Millar and Slavery, in Neil Walker, MacCormick’s Scotland, (EUP, 
2010), pp.102-103 
16 See the lectures of Professor John Miller in the late 18th century, wherein it is noted that ‘the judges [in Knight] 
were clearly and decidedly of opinion, that slavery was contrary both to the law of nature, and the municipal law 
of this country’: GUL, MS Gen. 243, 60 
17 As Cairns notes, there were at least two occasions, prior to 1778, in which the Scottish courts appeared to 
(implicitly) recognise the status of enslaved individuals as such: See Cairns, John Millar and Slavery, p.75.  
18 Cf. Miller, para.8. 
19 This is in line with the observation of Professor Allain that ‘as a result of its [slavery’s] legal abolition, so the 
thinking went, slavery no longer existed’: See Jean Allain, Identifying a Case of Slavery, in Kevin Bales (Ed.),  
Antislavery Usable Past Reader, (forthcoming, 2019), ch.11 
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‘things’ in ‘living Roman legal systems’, such as Scotland.20 Drawing on this discussion, the 
piece then considers the historical place of slavery in Scots law and investigates, with reference 
to the Acts of the pre-1707 Scottish Parliament providing for the astriction of colliers, coal-
bearers and salters to the mines,21 the extent to which the concept of slavery, as it would be 
recognised in domestic Scots and in international law, can be said to be necessarily bound up 
in notions of ownership. In concluding that, at present, the definition in European human rights 
law is necessarily so bound, the article closes by recommending that domestic Scots law draw 
on a wider definition of ‘slavery’ than that present in ECHR jurisprudence in order to capture 
the nature of the wrong that the Scottish Parliament sought to prohibit. 
B. ‘PERSONS’, ‘SERVITUDE’ AND ‘SLAVERY IN s.4 
Before embarking on a discussion of historical legal perspectives on ‘slavery’ and 
‘servitude’ it is necessary to establish what, precisely, Parliament has proscribed in passing s.4 
of the 2015 Act. For that reason, subsection 1 of the Act is reprinted below:  
(1)A person commits an offence if— 
(a) the person holds another person in slavery or servitude and the circumstances are 
such that the person knows or ought to know that the other person is so held, or 
(b) the person requires another person to perform forced or compulsory labour and the 
circumstances are such that the person knows or ought to know that the other person is 
being required to perform such labour. 
 As Lady Stacey indicated at first instance in Miller,22 per subsection (2), when defining 
‘slavery’ or ‘servitude’, one must have reference to the jurisprudence of Article 4 of the 
ECHR,23 which consequently here means that ‘slavery’ must be interpreted in light of the 1926 
Convention on Slavery per the decision in Siliadin v France.24 In respect of ‘servitude’, the 
prosecution must prove that there has been a ‘particularly serious form of denial of freedom’25 
                                                          
20 See Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law. (Hart, 2013), p.2. See also John W. 
Cairns and Paul Du Plessis, Ten Years of Roman Law in the Scottish Courts 2008 SLT 191 and David Walker, 
The Scottish Legal System: An Introduction to the Study of Scots Law (8th ed) (W. Green, 2001), p.41. 
21 See the Act Anent Coalyers and Salters 1606 APS iv 286, c.10 
22 Miller, para.8 
23 As the ‘Human Rights Convention’ is so defined in s.4 (6) 
24 Siliadin, para.122 
25 Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium 7906/77 [1982] ECHR 3, para.58 
4 
This is a peer-reviewed, accepted author manuscript of the following research article:  Brown, J. (Accepted/In 
press). Servitude, slavery and Scots law: historical perspectives on the Human Trafficking and Exploitation 
(Scotland) Act 2015. Legal Studies. 
which includes ‘in addition to the obligation to perform certain services for others ... the 
obligation for the 'serf' to live on another person's property and the impossibility of altering his 
condition’.26 As such, any prosecutor must demonstrate either that the accused held the victim 
as a slave within the ‘“classic”27 meaning of [that term] slavery as it was practised for 
centuries’,28 or that they held the victim in servitude within the aforementioned terms. 
Section 4 of the 2015 Act mirrors s.1 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 which applies to 
England and Wales.29 The courts of England and Wales are bound, then, like those of Scotland, 
to interpret ‘slavery’ or ‘servitude’ in the manner prescribed by Siliadin.30 Unlike in Scots law, 
however, ‘ownership’ is not traditionally recognised as a legal concept in the Common law 
world.31 Common law courts consequently have a certain degree of latitude in interpreting the 
term ‘ownership’, in defining slavery, which is not available to the Scottish courts.32 In 
Scotland, property law remains ‘resolutely Civilian in character’ and ‘ownership’ or dominium 
exists as a defined legal concept.33 Thus, on the face of it, the Scottish courts cannot convict a 
‘person’ of holding another in ‘slavery’, as Miller demonstrates, since in Scots law no person 
may hold another in their patrimony.     
 Indeed, in the Scottish context, the 2015 Act’s use of the term ‘person’ to refer to both 
perpetrator and victim is also notable. As Professor MacCormick discussed in his Institutions 
of Law, ‘being a person is additional to being a human being’,34  although by dint of Article 6 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights every human being has a claim-right to this 
‘additional recognition’.35 The ‘classic’ meaning of ‘slavery’ evolved before our present ‘age 
                                                          
26 Siliadin, para.123 
27 That is to say, the Roman: See Alan Watson, Slave Law in the Americas, (University of Georgia Press, 1989), 
p.129. As Watson notes, in the period of European colonialism, ‘Roman law [was] the model’, thus in the 
European colonies ‘a modified nonracist slave law was imposed on a racist slave society’. 
28 See Siliadin, para.122 
29 Modern Slavery Act 2015, s.60 (1) 
30 Ibid., s.1 (2) 
31 See J. E. Penner, The Concept of Property and the Concept of Slavery, in Jean Allain (Ed), The Legal 
Understanding of Slavery: From the Historical to the Contemporary, (OUP, 2012), p.242 
32 The English courts may be able to adopt a purposive approach to interpreting s.1 of the Modern Slavery Act 
2015; as indicated by the judgment in Miller, this option is not available to the Scottish courts as there must, by 
the construction of the statute, be evidence of legal ownership of a ‘person’ for ‘slavery’ to be established: Miller, 
para.9 
33 David L. Carey-Miller, Malcolm M. Combe, Andrew Steven and Scott Wortley, National report on the transfer 
of movables in Scotland in W Faber and B Lurger (eds.), National Reports on the Transfer of Movables in Europe 
Volume 2: England and Wales, Ireland, Scotland, Cyprus, (Sellier, 2009), p.311 
34 See Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory, (Oxford: OUP, 2007), p.77  
35 MacCormick, Institutions, p.77 
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of rights’36 and before international instruments such as the UDHR entreated signatory states 
to recognise the ‘inherent dignity… of all members of the human family’37 which is shared 
equally among all, regardless of colour, class or creed.38 Indeed, one of the primary hallmarks 
of this brand of slavery, as a legal institution, is the fact that it reifies – and so de-humanises – 
those whom the system deems to be ‘slaves’.39 Under any legal system which recognises 
slavery, certain human beings are denied ‘personhood’ and so denied legal protection, capacity 
and agency; as non-persons, they cannot be directly wronged in law. This, as demonstrated in 
the course of this article, has an obvious knock-on effect on the criminalisation of ‘slavery’ 
within terms of s.4. 
Since the 2015 Act must be interpreted in light of both the ‘classic’ meaning of slavery 
as set out in Siliadin and the peculiarly legal, rather than the now-everyday, meaning of the 
term ‘person’, in order for an accused to be convicted of the proscribed offence under 
subsection (1) (a), it must consequently be syllogistically40 established in any case that (1) the 
accused (the ‘master’) (P1) is a person (P*); (2) the complainer (the ‘slave’ or ‘serf’) (P2) is a 
person (P*);
41 (3) that P1 knowingly (or should have known that P1) held P2 in slavery or 
servitude. In order to establish (3), it must either be shown (I) that P1 exercised genuine rights 
of ownership over P2 (this necessitates there being extant some legal framework which permits 
ownership of human beings) or that (II) P1 denied P2 their freedom, required P2 to carry out 
services for P1’s benefit, forced P2 to live on P1’s land and afforded P2 no opportunity to change 
their status. As is apparent from the decision in the Miller case, it is possible for one to 
demonstrate (II) in modern Scots law, however establishing (I) is seemingly impossible, as in 
Scots law P1 can never be shown to have exercised a genuine legal right of ownership over P2. 
Indeed, as the historical investigation in this article establishes, it appears that the prohibition 
of slavery in s.4 (1) (a) would be legally meaningless in any Western legal system which 
employs the ‘“classic” meaning of slavery as it was practised for centuries’,42 since slaves were 
                                                          
36 François Du Bois, Private Law in the Age of Rights, in Elspeth C. Reid and Daniel Visser, Private Law and 
Human Rights: Bringing Rights Home in Scotland and South Africa, (Edinburgh: EUP, 2013), p.12 
37 Preamble; Article 1 
38 Article 2 
39 MacCormick, Institutions, p.85 
40 See Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law, (Oxford: OUP, 2005), p.147 
41 It must be emphasised that the fact of the humanity of either P1 or P2 is not conclusive evidence that either are 
‘persons’ in law. 
42 See Siliadin, para.122 
6 
This is a peer-reviewed, accepted author manuscript of the following research article:  Brown, J. (Accepted/In 
press). Servitude, slavery and Scots law: historical perspectives on the Human Trafficking and Exploitation 
(Scotland) Act 2015. Legal Studies. 
not ascribed juridical ‘personhood’ and so could not be designated P* for the purposes of any 
charge under this legislation.  
The ‘classic’ meaning of slavery is rooted in Roman law.43 Roman law, as noted above, 
forms the basis of the modern Scots law of property (as well as the property law of all other 
Civilian and Mixed jurisdictions),44 but in many European jurisdictions (including France and 
Scotland) in which slavery was not recognised in domestic common law, Roman slave law was 
not received.45 Nevertheless, Roman law, as it pertained to slaves and slave-ownership, was 
used to fill the ‘gaps in the law relating to slaves’ in the European colonies and Anglo-American 
judges adopted this method as readily as did those trained in the Civil law tradition proper.46 
As Phillips observed, ‘the Romans left slavery as a major legacy, whose distant legatees were 
the slaves and slave-owners of the Americas’.47 The Roman conceptualisation of ‘slavery’ as 
an institution which reifies and dehumanises the ‘slave’, consigning them to the status of ‘res’ 
(thing) thus evidently influenced the drafters of the 1926 Slavery Convention,48 which now 
provides the definition of ‘slavery’ within ECHR jurisprudence and, consequently, modern 
Scots law. Accordingly, it follows that the “classic” position of slavery merits some 
consideration, since to appropriately understand the interpretation of ‘slavery’ in 21st century 
Scotland (or, indeed, elsewhere), the key concepts at play remain rooted in Roman law.  
C. LEGAL PERSONS, LEGAL PROPERTY 
(1) Legal Persons and Legal Property in Roman Law 
The Emperor Justinian (and his juristic predecessor, Gaius) divided Roman law under 
three headings; the law of persons, the law of things and the law of actions.49 According to this 
                                                          
43 William D. Phillips, Jr., Slavery from Roman Times to the Early Transatlantic Trade, (University of Minnesota 
Press, 1985), p.16 
44 As Professor Reid observed on review of Vernon V. Palmer’s (Ed.) Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide, 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2012), ‘the law of property in mixed legal systems is always Civilian’: See Kenneth G. C. 
Reid, Patrimony not Equity: The Trust in Scotland, in Remus Valsan, Trust and Patrimonies, (Edinburgh 
University Press, 2015), p.111 
45 See Watson, Slave Law in the Americas, p.126; Sir George MacKenzie, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, 
(Edinburgh: John Reid, 1684), p.73 
46 Watson, Slave Law in the Americas, p.129 
47 Phillips, Slavery from Roman Times, p.16 
48 With its reliance on demonstrating the ‘master’s’ exercise of  ‘rights of ownership’ over the slave, the 
Convention clearly conceptualises ‘slavery’ in line with the Roman institution in which the slave is conceptualised 
as an object which is treated no differently from any other piece of property in the owner’s patrimony. 
49 Gai, Institutiones, I, 8; Justinian, Institutiones, I, Title II, para.12; per MacCormick ‘even in the twenty-first 
century, one can still say rather as Gaius did twenty centuries ago, that all law concerns persons, things and action: 
MacCormick, Institutions, p.77 
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schema – prima facie – all human beings were quintessentially corporeal res humani iuris50 
(‘things’ subject to human, as opposed to divine, law) and so could be ‘owned’ by others.51 In 
order for a human being to escape designation as a mere res, or ‘thing’ wholly subject to the 
despotic control of another,52 said human being would require juridical recognition of their 
libertas (liberty) and caput (civil status, or ‘personhood’) within the terms of the ius quod ad 
personas pertinet (the law pertaining to persons).53  
From the outset of the title de Iure Personarum (‘the law of persons’), Justinian 
observes that ‘the primary division in the law of persons is between those human beings that 
are free and those that are slaves’.54 Read within the wider context of the Corpus Iuris Civile, 
however, it is plain that ‘a slave was not a “person” at all’.55 Though a human being, a slave 
had neither libertas nor caput56 and was governed by the same rules that applied to domestic 
animals.57 In this light, it seems that Roman slaves lacked even the ‘pure passive capacity’58 
(i.e., ‘the condition of being eligible to receive the protection of law for one’s own sake’) that 
is the ‘minimum legal recognition that can be conferred on any being’.59 Though there were 
several Imperial rulings which were designed to afford protection to slaves, these were 
‘concerned with the specific issue of slaves as property’ and so can be said to be comparable 
in scope and design to modern animal welfare legislation60 (where such falls short of ascribing 
‘personhood’ to animals).61 As Moyle observes ‘so far as there is any difference of treatment 
                                                          
50 Gaius, Institutes, 2, 8; Justinian, Institutes, 2, 2, 12 
51 Gaius, Institutes, 2, 9. As Watson emphasises, by the time of the lex Aquilia, ‘the killing of, and injuries to, 
slaves are classed along with the killing of, and injuries to, herd animals’: Alan Watson, Roman Slave Law, 
(Baltimore: JHUP, 1987), p.46 
52 See the discussion in Simone Weil, La Personne et le Sacré, translated as Human Personality by Richard Rees 
in Selected Essays 1934-1943, (Oxford: OUP, 1962), p.62 
53 As Esposito notes, ‘persons are defined primarily by the fact that they are not things, and things by the fact that 
they are not persons’: Roberto Esposito, Persons and Things, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), p.16 
54 Summa itaque divisio de iure personarum haec est quod omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi’: Justinian, 
Institutes, Book I, Title 3, para.1; this sentiment is mirrored in Gaius’ Institutes: ‘et quidem summa divisio de iure 
personarum haec est quod omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi’: Gai, Institutiones, Book I Title III, §9 
55 See J. B. Moyle, Imperatoris Iustiniani Institutiones Libri Quattuor: With Introductions, Commentary and 
Excursus, (3rd Ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), p.111 
56 George Long, Caput, in William Smith, A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, (London: John Murray, 
1875), p.239 
57 See the discussion in Alan Watson, Rights of Slaves and Other Owned-Animals, [1997] Animal Law 1, pp.1-6 
58 MacCormick, Institutions, p.86 
59 MacCormick, Institutions, p.94 
60 Watson, Slaves and Other Owned-Animals, p.4 
61 On this point, see Linda R. Danil, Legal personhood for non-human animals? The case of the Non-Human 
Rights Project, (26/04/2018, UK Human Rights Blog) 
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[between slaves and animals in law] it is due to the slave’s possession of reason, so that (a) he 
is able to increase his master’s means by his intellectual as well as by his physical powers, and 
(b) by manumission he is capable of becoming a “person”’.62 
The latter point is significant; unlike in a system of slavery which is wholly predicated 
on racism, in Roman law ‘enslavement could happen to anyone; even to a Roman citizen. Being 
a slave was no indication of moral or intellectual inferiority’.63 This contradistinction between 
the Roman institution of slavery and the race-based system of slavery which arose in the later 
European colonies does not imply that the lot of the Roman slave was in any way better than 
his counterpart in (say) 18th century Jamaica.64 Neither he nor his African (or African-
descended)65 compatriot were ‘persons’ within the eyes of the law (of their respective societies) 
and both were regarded as ‘property’ de jure. The distinction between racial and non-racial 
slavery lay only in the fact that the lot of a Roman slave who was subsequently freed was 
generally66 better than a manumitted black slave in any system based on racial segregation,67 
since the former might attain the ‘coveted’ status of citizenship,68 while the latter would not 
                                                          
Accessible at: https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2018/04/26/legal-personhood-for-non-human-animals-the-case-
of-the-non-human-rights-project-dr-linda-roland-danil/ ) 
62 Moyle, Imperatoris Iustiniani Institutiones, pp.111-112. Even Westrup, who takes pains to emphasise the 
perceived personhood of slaves in the earliest days of Rome, concedes that the slave in later Roman law merely 
‘bore the germ of an individual personality (persona)’ due to the possibility of manumission: See C. W. Westrup, 
Some Notes on the Roman Slave in Early Times, (Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1956), p.12 
63 For a discussion of such, see Watson, Slaves and Other Owned-Animals, pp.1-5 
64 Naturally, one must here bear in mind Westermann’s remark that ‘the best criterion for determining the rigidity 
and the harshness of any slave system is to be found in the case and availability of its manumission procedures’: 
See William L. Westermann, The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity, (Philadelphia: American 
Philosophical Society, 1955), p.25 
65 Within the context of British colonial slavery, it should be noted that slaves were drawn from other holdings 
including (inter alia) India, Pakistan and Bangladesh: Provided that one was not white, one might find oneself 
‘owned’ as a slave.  
66 Though not exclusively: though ‘manumission gave, in general, the coveted Roman citizenship’, ‘slaves who 
had been put in bonds, branded by their owner or tortured by the state for a crime and found guilty of it would 
not, if subsequently freed, become citizens, but have the lowly status of peregrini dediticii (surrendered enemies)’: 
Watson, Slaves and Other Owned-Animals, pp.2-3 
67 As Finely observed, though early modern advocates of slavery did find recourse to Roman law in providing 
intellectual justification for their position, and indeed they ‘adopted [the Roman framework] almost in toto’, the 
racist colonial institution of slavery nevertheless came to diverge significantly from the position found in Roman 
law, as the law of manumission was (gradually) modified to become as minimal and as restricted as possible: Sir 
Moses I. Finely, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1980), pp.18-19   
68 Indeed, it has been noted that ‘Roman law gave the private citizen, owner of a slave, greater power than that 
given to the supreme Roman magistrate, who, in order to naturalise a foreigner, needed the conformation of the 
city’s assemblies or an authorisation by the Senate’, since any slave-owner could confer Roman citizenship upon 
his slaves by mere act of manumission: See L. Capogrossi Colognesi, Peregrini and Slaves in the Roman Empire, 
[1996] Fundamina 236, p.244  
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attain69 (and indeed it may be said that their descendants have not yet won) full civil rights in 
the eyes of the law.70  
The term ‘persona’ was not therefore, in Roman law, synonymous with ‘homo’, just as 
the word ‘person’ is not identical to the term ‘human being’ in historical, nor indeed modern, 
Scots law. While the scope of the word ‘person’ has now been extended to encompass 
incorporeal entities such as companies and business partnerships,71 and in some jurisdictions 
the legal status of ‘person’ has been conferred upon natural resources and landmarks,72 in 
Roman law the term persona was much narrower in scope.73 It was not, as Professor Nicholas 
suggested in his Introduction to Roman Law,74 a word with no technical meaning, denoting 
only ‘as “person” does in ordinary speech today, a human being, whether capable of holding 
rights and duties or not’.75 Instead, as Professor Waelkens observed ‘in legal texts the word 
was used for the actors in a law suit. When the word occurs in the Corpus Iuris Civile, it has 
thus to be understood as referring to one of the men present in court’.76  
Rather than finding use as a device to extend the benefits of ‘personhood’ to entities 
other than human beings, the status of persona was, consequently, fundamentally exclusive. In 
addition being restricted in scope only to ‘natural’ legal persons,77 the designation of ‘persons’ 
also served as a primarily procedural status which distinguished those who held full 
entitlements under the civil law from those who did not.78 As Professor Esposito noted in his 
text on Persons and Things, this was explicitly by design:79 ‘the more human beings that an 
                                                          
69 See the infamous decision in Dred Scott v Sandford 1857 US Supreme Court  
70 See Note, The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, [2013] Harv. L. Rev. 1078, p.1091 
71 Care should be taken to avoid categorising such extension of ‘personhood’ to incorporeal entities as a legal 
‘fiction’, as MacCormick cautions: See MacCormick, Institutions, p.84 
72 See the discussion in Erin L. O'Donnell and Julia Talbot-Jones, Creating Legal Rights for Rivers: Lessons from 
Australia, New Zealand, and India, [2018] Ecology and Society 7 
73 Per Horsman and Korsten, the term persona ‘distinguish[ed] holders of full civil rights from those who lacked 
such civil personhood’: See Yasco Horsman and Frans-Willem Korsten, Introduction: Legal Bodies: 
Corpus/Persona/Communitas, [2016] Law and Literature 277, p.277 
74 Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) 
75 Nicholas, Introduction, p.60 
76 Laurent L. J. M. Waelkens, Medieval Family and Marriage Laws: From Actions of Status to Legal Doctrine, 
in John W. Cairns and Paul J. du Plessis, The Creation of the Ius Commune: From Casus to Regula, (Edinburgh: 
EUP, 2010), p.104 
77 Nicholas, Introduction, p.61 
78 See Yasco Horsman and Frans-Willem Korsten, Introduction: Legal Bodies: Corpus/Persona/Communitas, 
[2016] Law and Literature 277, p.277 
79 Though in turn, by design, the Roman Emperors began, at the beginning of the third century, a process of 
extending the scope and reach of the ius civile to bring as many human beings as possible under its umbrella: See 
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individual manages to place on the sloping plane of the thing, the more solidly he or she 
acquires the title of person’.80 Thus, not only were slaves excluded from the horizon of 
personhood, but women and children were likewise81 (though they could be afforded the status 
of persona if they were represented by a tutor in court).82 Generally, in Roman law, those who 
remained in alieni iuris (in the power of another – i.e., within the patria potestas of a 
paterfamilias) were not ‘persons’, though they might have the potential to be recognised as 
such in certain circumstances.83 Slaves and peregrini (foreigners) had no entitlements under 
the ius civile and so were likewise not personae;84 they did not escape the designation of res 
ascribed to them under the ius quod ad res pertinet (the law pertaining to things) of the ius 
civile.85 
Esposito’s observation, and the state of Roman law as described above, correlates with 
the observations of Adam Smith that though ‘the work done by freemen comes cheaper in the 
end than that done by slaves’,86 humankind ‘will generally prefer the services of slaves to that 
                                                          
Ralph W. Mathisen, Peregrini, Barbari, and Cives Romani: Concepts of Citizenship and the Legal Identity of 
Barbarians in the Later Roman Empire, [2006] American Historical Review 1011, p.1013 
80 See Esposito, Persons and Things, p.27; note, also, Tay’s remarks that ‘property is that which a man has a right 
to use and enjoy without interference; it is what makes him a person’: Alice Tay, Law, the Citizen and the State, 
in E. Kamenka, R. Brown and A. Tay (eds.), Law and Society:  The Crisis in Legal Ideals, (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1978), p.10. While Esposito consciously avoids the use of gendered language, Tay self-consciously 
employs it in explicit recognition of the differential of power enjoyed by men in claims of ‘personhood’. 
81 It should, however, be recognised that some women – those sui iuris – were recognised as paterfamilias in their 
own right and so would possess ‘personhood’ within the meaning discussed in this article. This ‘personhood’ was 
always more limited than that afforded to men, however, since the designation of paterfamilias could only ever 
be applied to women in a reduced sense: Women were not permitted to hold patria potestas – paternal power over 
life and death – over their children, as men could: See Richard P. Saller, Pater Familias, Mater Familias, and the 
Gendered Semantics of the Roman Household, [1999] Classical Philology 182; Gaius, Institutes, Book II, para.104 
82 See the discussion in Waelkens, Medieval Family and Marriage Laws, pp.104-105 
83 There was, however, a distinction to be drawn between the place of those under the potestas of a pater and the 
slave within the familia in Roman law. The pater enjoyed dominium – a relationship of ownership conferring 
powers of use, abuse and entitlements to the ‘fruits’ (benefits generated by labour) – over the slave, since the slave 
belonged fully to the province of the ius quod ad res pertinet. By contrast, the family member held in potestas 
was subject to the ius quod ad personas pertinet: See Gai, Institutiones, Book I, Tit.8-9; though this potestas gives 
the power many of the marks of ‘property’ as it might be conceptualised in modern terms, it is evident that patria 
potestas is fundamentally distinct from the concept of proprietary ‘rights’: See C. W. Westrup, Some Notes on the 
Roman Slave in Early Times, (Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1956), p.8 
84 Westrup, Notes on the Roman Slave in Early Times, p.15 
85 Peregrini were, however, afforded ‘rights’ under the ius gentium, rather than the ius civile, but as the discussion 
above makes clear, slaves could lay claim to (almost) no entitlements. As Professor van den Berg observed 
recently, the Romans did not regard slavery as a morally objectionable institution and so, ‘they did not feel the 
need to grant legal capacity to [slaves]… according to Roman law, slaves were just res’: Peter A. J. van den Berg, 
Slaves: Persons or Property? The Roman Law on Slavery and its Reception in Western Europe and its Overseas 
Territories, [2016] Osaka University Law Review 171, p.187 
86 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Cases of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. I, viii.41 
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of freemen’87 given that ‘the pride of man makes him love to domineer, and nothing mortifies 
him so much as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors’.88 For as long as man 
regards women, children, foreigners and his servants as his ‘inferiors’, then he is likely to 
actively seek to diminish the ‘personhood’ of those whom he perceives as beneath him. Such 
tendencies will, naturally, be exaggerated in any cultural milieu which finds slavery morally 
unobjectionable. 
As an instrumentum vocale – a ‘speaking tool’ – it is obvious that the slave could be 
said to ‘hover’, in part, between ‘the regime of persons and things’, in much the same way that 
‘wives, sons and insolvent debtors’ did so.89 From the above discussion, however, it is likewise 
plain that as a matter of Roman law, all human beings were – first and foremost – ‘things’, with 
some such ‘things’ being distinguished from the others primarily by dint of their possession of 
the status of ‘person’.90 To be a ‘person’, in Roman law, was therefore to hold some significant 
status. This significant status was afforded to those who were sui iuris or paterfamilias and 
thus entitled to appear in the law courts. Foreigners were denied this status, though they did 
have the protection of the ius gentium and their own ‘personal’ law,91 but slaves – who were 
also and always denied ‘personhood’ – were mere things subject to be used and abused by their 
owners however that owner saw fit. Though it is certainly true and notable that several laws 
were passed, in Roman times, aimed at improving the lot of slaves, it is equally plain that such 
juridical acts fell far short of affording legal recognition to the personhood – or even the 
humanity – of those enslaved. As Watson stated in a 1997 work, ‘in restraining cruelty no 
mention is made of the slave’s well-being’.92 It is, rather, said only to be ‘in the interest of the 
state that no one should abuse his property’.93 
From the above discussion, it may consequently be inferred that the prohibition of 
slavery in the 2015 Act would have been nugatory in the Roman legal system, as well as in 
                                                          
87 Smith, Wealth of Nations, Vol. I, viii.41 
88 Smith, Wealth of Nations, Vol. I, viii.41 
89 See Esposito, Persons and Things, p.26 
90 Indeed, as Buckland notes, a slave who was abandoned by their master would not become free, but rather 
become res nullius – a thing owned by no one – who would consequently come to be owned by the first personas 
to take possession of the abandoned slave – see William W. Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery: The Condition 
of the Slave in Private Law from Augustus to Justinian, (Cambridge: CUP, 1908), p.2   
91 See Simeon L. Guterman, The Principle of the Personality of Law in the Early Middle Ages: A Chapter in the 
Evolution of Western Legal Institutions and Ideas, [1966] University of Miami Law Review 259, p.261 
92 Watson, Slaves and Other Owned-Animals, p.4 
93 Justinian, Institutes, I, Title 8, para.1 
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modern Scots law (as is hypothesised, and shall be discussed further, in this paper). If the term 
‘slavery’ within the context of s.4, is indeed to be understood as proscribing the holding of 
another as a slave within a legal framework of property law, then it might be inferred that the 
wording of the legislation as it stands cannot possibly criminalise the conduct of any private 
‘person’ within a Romanistic legal system. At present, s.4 proclaims that ‘a person commits an 
offence if (a) the person holds another person in slavery’. From the above discussion, however, 
it is plain that no ‘person’ can be lawfully held in slavery, since it is the absence of juridical 
‘personhood’, on the part of the slave, which allows the law to recognise the legal relationship 
of ‘ownership’ between that slave and their ‘owner’.94  
It would be impossible, then, to convict one who ‘owned’ a slave, in the Roman sense, 
of the offence of holding another person as a slave under s.4 of the 2015 Act. Indeed, unlike in 
Miller, it would likewise be impossible to convict the slave-holder of the offence of holding 
another ‘person’ in servitude since, in law, the slave-owner has done no such thing. The slave-
owner owns a res – a piece of property.95 The slave-owner does not own a ‘person’, nor do 
they hold a ‘person’ in servitude. Rather than standing in any position akin to that of a modern 
employer (or ‘master’, as employers were historically styled)96 when enjoying the benefit of 
the slave’s labour, the slave-owner simply acts as a property owner enjoying ius fruendi: since 
the slave is a thing, the results of that slave’s labour are juridically the fruits of a thing. No 
‘person’ is, therefore, held in servitude under such circumstances: within terms of the analysis 
above, our Roman P1 is P*, but in this instance the enslaved P2 is demonstrably not.         
It goes (or should go) without saying that the dehumanisation and depersonalisation 
involved in the lawful institution of slavery is utterly immoral. The above discussion is liable 
to affront all modern moral sensibilities and the very discussion of slavery as a ‘legal’ 
institution has provoked disgust from some legal commentators. With that said, however, the 
historical position in respect of slavery and servitude must be discussed if the words ‘slavery’ 
and ‘servitude’ are to be ascribed any real meaning in modern legislation, particularly since the 
2015 Act – by drawing on the ECHR – is bound up with the ‘classical’ definition of ‘slavery’. 
                                                          
94 Though compare the discussion above to Thomas Wood’s 1704 New Institutes of the Civil Law: Thomas Wood, 
A New Institute of the Imperial or Civil Law, (London: Richard Sare, 1704), p.30, wherein this English jurist 
notably describes slaves as ‘persons’. 
95 ‘[The slave] always remained for the Roman, firmly and realistically, corporeal property whose value could be 
measured in monetary terms’: Watson, Roman Slave Law, p.46 
96 See Simon Deakin, The Contract of Employment: A Study in Legal Evolution, [2001] Historical Studies In 
Industrial Relations 32; Sam Middlemiss and Margaret Downie, Employment Law in Scotland, (2nd Ed.) 
(Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury, 2015), para.1.3 
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Thus, given the influence that Roman slave law exercised on both the Common law and 
Continental European legal traditions, the above discussion is warranted.97 Likewise, 
consideration of the artificial distinction between slaves as ‘things’ and freemen as ‘persons’ 
is also warranted within the particular Scottish context, as it is this arbitrary divide that allowed 
for the Court of Session to declare, in 1687, that ‘we have no slaves in Scotland’,98 in spite of 
the provisions of the Act Anent Coalyers and Salters 1606 (the 1606 Act),99 which was not 
repealed until 1775.100  
(2) Scots Law, Slavery and Serfdom  
Viscount Stair affords considerable attention to the subject of liberty, servitude and 
slavery in his opus, the Institutions of the Law of Scotland.101 In the second title of the text, in 
line with the Romanistic position outlined above, Stair states that ‘bondage exeemeth man from 
the account of persons, and brings him rather in among things, quae sunt in patrimonio nostro 
[i.e., things which might be held by another in private patrimony]’.102 Affront to one’s liberty, 
he says, ‘are the most bitter and atrocious’ forms of injury, though the right to liberty is not to 
be taken as an absolute.103 One’s liberty might be lawfully constrained for a number of reasons: 
as a result of obediential obligation;104 as a result of penal punishment or civil incarceration for 
non-payment of debt;105 and by the dictate of the sovereign.106 In addition to this, Stair 
recognises that ‘liberty is wholly taken away by bondage, slavery or servitude, which is 
                                                          
97 Indeed, in the words of Professor Cairns, ‘From the start of sophisticated legal discussion of slavery in Scotland, 
Roman concepts were in use to understand the phenomenon, and slaves were understood to be property’: See John 
W. Cairns, The Definition of Slavery in 18th Century Thinking: Not the True Roman Slavery in The Legal 
Understanding of Slavery (2012), p.72 
98 Reid v Scot of Hardin and His Lady (1687) Mor. 9505 
99 APS iv 286, c.10 
100 See the Colliers and Salters (Scotland) Act 1775 15 Geo III c. 28, although it should be noted that it took a 
second Act – the 1799 Act of Parliament to Explain and Amend the Laws Relative to Colliers in Scotland – to 
finally ‘free’ the colliers from ‘servitude’: See the discussion in John Erskine, The Principles of the Law of 
Scotland: In the Order of Sir G. Mackenzie's Institutions, (12th Ed.) (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1827), p.117  
101 Unless otherwise noted, reference to Stair in this article is reference to the 2nd edition reprint edited by David 
M. Walker. The second edition of Stair’s text is said to be ‘on the whole, the best’ by John S. More, editor of the 
5th edition, and indeed it is from this edition that the four subsequent editions of the work have been based  (though 
not, as Professor Walker notes, without, in the cases of the third, fourth and fifth editions, the editors having ‘at 
many points taken liberties, frequently very great liberties, with Stair’s text): See David M. Walker (Ed.) Stair: 
The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, (Glasgow: GUP, 1981), p.47 
102 Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 2 
103 Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 2-5 
104 Stair gives the following example (inter alia): ‘a husband hath power to restrain his wife from her liberty of 
going where she will, and may keep her within the bounds of conjugal society’: Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 5 
105 Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 6-7 
106 Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 8 
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diametrically opposed to liberty; for as liberty is that power, by which men are sui iuris, so by 
servitude they become alieni iuris’.107 In Stair’s schema therefore, in spite of the high level of 
importance ascribed to individual liberty, ‘bondage, though contrary to the nature of liberty… 
is lawful, liberty being a right alienable, and in our disposal’.108 
In common with the Romans,109 Stair locates the law of slavery within the ius 
gentium,110 rather than the ius naturale, noting that ‘bondage was introduced by the law of 
nations, and it is amongst the positive laws of nations settled by common consuetude’.111 The 
‘leniency’ and ‘mercy’ of the Christian religion had, according to Stair,112 by his time effected 
the abrogation of slavery in almost all European nations (save Spain, Portugal and those nations 
bordering the Ottoman Empire, who ‘may have slaves to exchange with slaves’),113 yet it was 
nevertheless recognised that adscriptitii (i.e., ‘serfs’)114 – ‘who are not absolutely slaves’,115 
though nevertheless in servitude116 – subsisted in England (as villainage),117 ‘but in Scotland 
there is no such thing’.118 Adscriptitii, unlike those bound in vassalage or ‘free’ labourers and 
artisans, were (in Stair’s conceptualisation) essentially serfs bound to the land on which they 
                                                          
107 Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 9 
108 Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 11 
109 See the discussion in Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, (Cambridge: Eerdman’s, 1997), p.136 
110 Dig.1.1.4 
111 Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 10; this follows from Regiam Majestatem, in which it is recognised that manumission is a 
product of the ius gentium also: See Regiam Majestatem I, Cap 14 
112 Though for a critical consideration of this assertion, see John Millar, The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks, 
(Aaron Garrett ed.) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006), pp.264-267 
113 Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 11 
114 Cf. Sir Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum; A Discourse on the Commonwealth of England, (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1906), p.130: ‘[The adscripti] were not bound to the person but to the manor or place, and did follow him 
who had the mannors, and in our law are called villains regardants’. 
115 Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 11; though Ballentine’s Law Dictionary of 1916 does simply – without further comment 
– define adscriptitii as ‘slaves’ – see James A. Ballentine, A Law Dictionary, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 
1916),  p.10 
116 Such was the similarity in factual circumstance between the Roman slave and the feudal serf that ‘Bracton 
thought himself entitled to assume equality of condition between the English villain and the Roman slave’: Sir 
Paul Vinogradoff, Villainage in England : Essays in English Mediaeval History, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), 
p.47, though it has been suggested that one should not readily assume that the mediaeval word ‘servus’ was wholly 
analogous to the word in classical Latin: Peter A. J. van den Berg, Slaves: Persons or Property? The Roman Law 
on Slavery and its Reception in Western Europe and its Overseas Territories, [2016] Osaka University Law 
Review 171, p.177   
117 Of which, see Vinogradoff, Villainage in England, passim.  
118 Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 11; the wording of this part is identical in the 1st edition of (1681) (printed by the heir of 
Andrew Anderson) and the second edition of 1693 (also originally printed by the heir of Andrew Anderson). In 
Erskine’s Principles (Rankin ed.), however, colliers, salters and coal-bearer are likened to the adscriptitii: See 
John Rankine (Ed.), Erskine’s Principles of the Law of Scotland, (21st Edn.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1911), p.105  
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laboured;119 they could not leave the land nor could they be sold by their ‘masters’, as they 
were ‘fixed to and follow’ the land ‘and they are conveyed therewith’.120 According to 
Professor Millar, writing almost a century after Stair,121 in Scotland villainage had fallen into 
disuse by the late seventeenth century ‘without any aid of statute’,122 though even by Millar’s 
time ‘the period when this change was effected [had] not been ascertained by lawyers or 
historians’.123  
Even while the institution of serfdom was recognised, however, and Scottish 
adscriptitii, villains or serfs were recognised as being in bondage and so not fully ‘persons’, 
they were not ‘absolutely’ slaves.124 From this, it consequently follows that they cannot be 
deemed to have been only ‘things’, as Roman slaves were.125 Rather, it seems that the Scottish 
serf – prior to the abrogation of the concept of serfdom – must be thought to have lain in an 
intermediate field between the law of ‘persons’ and the law of ‘things’. While, in some sense, 
they may have been viewed as closer to ‘things’ than to ‘persons’ in the eyes of the law, it 
nevertheless remains the case that it cannot be said that there existed a clear binary between 
‘persons’ and ‘things’ in early Scots law. The slave was ‘absolutely’ a thing; the freeman 
‘absolutely’ a person. The bondman was something in between; sometimes person, sometimes 
thing, sometimes both. In effect, their legal position was comparable to that of a slave in the 
familia under early Roman law;126 indeed, when speaking of bondmen, Regiam Majestatem 
never once utilises the word ‘dominium’ to describe the relationship between bondman and 
                                                          
119 For ‘serfdom’ as it subsisted in early Scots law, see Regiam Majestatem, I, Cap.11-14 
120 Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 15 
121 Millar’s work, the Origin of the Distinction of Ranks, was first published in 1771. The text went through three 
editions in the author’s lifetime: See the discussion in Cairns, John Millar and Slavery, passim. 
122 Millar, The Distinction of Ranks, p.268 
123 Millar, The Distinction of Ranks, pp.268-269 
124 See also Baron F. Duckham, Serfdom in Eighteenth Century Scotland, [1969] History 178, p.178  
125 Indeed, though, in Roman law ‘all men are either free or slaves – there is no third, intermediate category’ 
(Watson, Roman Slave Law, p.7), early Scots law recognised categories in between these binaries. Regiam 
Majestatem notes that though the ius gentium recognised three types of human beings: The freemen and their 
opposites, the slaves, as well as those who were once slaves but have now been freed, a fourth type of human 
being came to be recognised ‘ab ebrietate Noae’ (in the drunkenness of Noah): The bondman. While the tripartite 
division of human beings is lifted almost wholesale from Ulpian and Justinian’s Institutes: (Dig.1.14; Justinian, 
Institutes, I, 5) the allusion to bondmen appears to have its root in Gratian’s Decretals (I, 35, 8) and demonstrates 
the unique – and non-Roman – classification of bondmen as something other than plain ‘persons’ or mere ‘things’: 
See Lord Cooper of Culross (Ed. And Trs.), Regiam Majestatem and Quoniam Attachiamenta Based on the Text 
of Sir John Skene, (Edinburgh: Stair Society, 1947), p.118 
126 See Westrup, Notes on the Roman Slave in Early Times, p.12 
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master, but instead, like the earliest Roman sources, uses the term ‘potestas’,127 denoting 
‘power’ rather than ‘ownership’.  
After the systemising efforts of jurists such as Craig, MacKenzie and Stair himself 
(though Stair was notably critical or the Romanistic schema), the Roman tripartite division of 
law into ‘persons’, ‘things’ and ‘actions’ was received into early modern Scots law.128 It is thus 
at this juncture – after the institution of agrarian serfdom had vanished from Scotland129 – that 
a perceived persons/property binary might be said to have first emerged in Scotland, however 
as with the later divide between ‘property law’ (i.e., ‘thing-law’) and the law of obligations,130 
this binary cannot be said to be absolute – and, as such, is to be more appropriately understood 
as a continuum than an absolute separation. Thus, agrarian serfs, while they existed in Scots 
law, were undoubtedly in servitude, although they were manifestly not ‘slaves’, since slavery 
necessarily entails a full denial of the personhood of the slave.  
With that said, though emphasising that agrarian serfdom had ceased to subsist in 
Scotland,131 Stair nevertheless accepted that Scots law recognised ‘a kind of bondage’ called 
‘Manrent’,132 but went on to emphasise that this institution placed the ‘free persons’ in clientela 
(in vassalage) rather than in bondage, and that in any case it had been abolished by subsequent 
Parliamentary Acts and custom.133 Rather than being conceptualised as slaves (and so ‘things’), 
under Scots law ‘servants’ were adjudged to be free ‘persons’ who have hired their labour by 
contract,134 just as any modern ‘contract of service’ relationship between employer and 
employee might be so understood.135 Against this background (Stair’s Institutions having first 
                                                          
127 See Regiam Majestatem I Cap.14. ‘Dominus’ – in the sense of ‘Lord’ or ‘Master’ – is used within the chapters 
of Regiam Majestatem pertinent to the subject of bondmen, but nothing therein implies that the Lord or Master 
exercises ‘ownership’ of their bondmen; rather, the bondmen are ‘manui et potestati sui domini subjectus est’: 
Subject to the power and hand of their Lord’. 
128 See the discussion in Jonathan Brown, Jus Quaesitum Tertio: A Res, not a Right? [2019] Jur. Rev. 53, p.72. 
Due to the expanding importance of the law of obligations, the Roman tripartite iurum divisione has expanded 
into a quadripartite division, recognised as comprising ‘Scots private law’ within the Scotland Act 1998, per s.126 
(4). 
129 See also Duckham, Serfdom, p.178 
130 See the discussion in Brown, Jus Quaesitum Tertio, p.72 
131 See also Duckham, Serfdom, p.178  
132 Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 12 
133 Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 11; APS ii 50, c.24 and APS ii 487, c.17 
134 Stair, Institute, 1, 2, 15 
135 Middlemiss and Downie appear, therefore, to err when, in their text on Employment Law in Scotland, they 
suggest that in Scots law at this time ‘the master not only had a right to the fruits of the labour of his slave, but he 
became the legal owner, body and soul, of a human being whom the law counted as a chattel’: See Sam Middlemiss 
and Margaret Downie, Employment Law in Scotland, (2nd Ed.) (Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury, 2015), para.1.2. 
The relationship described by Stair appears to fit better within the framework of the ‘Victorian’ master-servant 
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been published in 1681),136 and combined with Sir George MacKenzie’s observation that ‘we 
have little use in Scotland, of what the Institutions of the Roman Law teach, concerning 
slaverie… for we as Christians allow no Men to be made Slaves’,137 the stage was set for the 
Court of Session to rule, in 1687, that ‘we have no slaves in Scotland’.138 
Yet, at the time that Reid was decided, the aforementioned Act Anent Coalyers and 
Salters of 1606139 remained in force throughout Scotland. This legislation provided, inter alia, 
that no one was to employ a salter, collier or coal-bearer without the approval of the ‘Maister 
whom they last served’, that ‘vagabonds and sturdie beggers’ could be apprehended and put to 
work in the mines and that any salter, collier or coal-bearer who left the employ of their master 
were to ‘be esteemed, reput and halded as theives [sic], and punished in their bodies’. In effect, 
then, the legislation provided that colliers, salters and coal-bearers were, in like manner to 
agrarian serfs, absent liberty, bound to the mines in which they laboured, and thus evidently in 
the power of the mine-owner or master. This state of servitude could only be altered with the 
leave of the ‘Maister whom they last served’, so this astricted status was life-long. 
In spite of the statutes ordaining the bondage of colliers and salters, Stair made no 
mention of the lot of these unfortunate bondmen in either of the editions of his Institutions 
published during his lifetime. Only bondage to farms and villages appears to enter Stair’s 
cognisance;140 it is only by a later editorial hand that consideration of colliers and salters 
appears in the Institutions. The consideration given in the later editions of Stair’s work is 
consistent with Scottish legal literature of the 18th century. In the intervening period between 
the 2nd and 3rd editions of Stair’s work,141 in 1722,142 the first Regius Professor of law at the 
                                                          
relationship, rather than any ‘master-slave’ relationship and, though it is the case ‘that on several estates the 
children of coal workers were considered to be life bound too brings the Scottish experience within the margins 
of a slave system… the temptation to overstate the argument should be resisted’ per Christopher Whatley, The 
Dark Side of the Enlightenment: Sorting Out Serfdom’, in Eighteenth Century Scotland: New Perspectives, (East 
Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1999), p. 262 
136 The second edition was published in 1693. Various manuscript copies which were later incorporated into the 
final published editions began circulating from as early as 1664: See G. M. Hutton, Purpose and Pattern of the 
Institutions, in David M. Walker (Ed.), Stair Tercentenary Studies, (Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1981), pp.79-
105 
137 MacKenzie, Institutions, p.73 
138 (1687) Mor. 9505 
139 APS iv 286, c.10 
140 Stair, Institutes, 1, 2, 11 is unchanged between the first and second edition 
141 The third edition of Stair’s work appeared in 1759; the fourth and fifth editions were each published in the 
early nineteenth century (1826 and 1832 respectively). 
142 See William Forbes, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: J. Watson, 1722) 
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University of Glasgow, William Forbes, published the first volume of his own Institutes of the 
Law of Scotland.143 This work, as Professor MacQueen observed, offers an important insight 
into the position of Scots law in the period between the appearance of Stair’s work and the 
publication of the later Institute of Bankton.144  
Though Forbes, like Stair, posited that ‘we have no vestige of slavery remaining in 
Scotland’,145 he – unlike Stair – thereafter went on to compare the position of colliers and 
salters to that of slaves ‘at the arbitrary pleasure of [their] masters’ who ‘may be sold by him 
as goods’.146 In setting out the effect of the 1606 Act, Forbes implicitly regarded colliers and 
salters as ‘things’, suggesting that should a master lose ‘possession’ of their labourers, that 
master might raise an action against ‘any unlawful possessor… the possessor must deliver [the 
collier or salter] back to their Master within twenty four hours’ under the pain of a fine.147 The 
language of ‘possession’, naturally, implies ‘property’.148 
Forbes’ Institutions are, in large part, an abridgement of his unpublished life’s work,149 
the Great Body of the Law of Scotland.150 This titanic work, which exceeds a million words 
and remained unfinished (and thus unpublished) at the time of Forbes’ death,151 though he had 
worked on it for some thirty-seven years,152 ‘has lain almost unread in Glasgow University 
Library since 1786’.153 The work does, however, ‘provide the fullest account available of Scots 
law in the early eighteenth century’;154 as such, it merits consideration here as it provides an 
                                                          
143 A work which, at best, exercised a ‘rather muted’ influence on the development of Scots law: See Hector L. 
MacQueen, Introduction, in William Forbes, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Legal 
Education Trust, 2012), p.vi 
144 See MacQueen, Introduction, p.x 
145 Forbes, Institutes, p.91 
146 Forbes, Institutes, p.91 
147 Forbes, Institutes, p.91 
148 Though, of course, as Ulpian reminds us, ‘nihil commune habet proprietas cum possessione’: Dig.41.2.12.1 
149 See Andrew Herd, William Forbes, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland, with an introduction by Hector L. 
MacQueen, [2014] Edin. L. R. 300, p.301 
150 William Forbes, A Great Body of the Law of Scotland, containing the harmony thereof, and differences from 
the civil and feudal laws: and shewing how far the Scots and English law do agree and differ; with incident 
comparative views of the modern constitutions of other nations in Europe, (1708-1745). The text is accessible via 
the following hyperlink: https://www.forbes.gla.ac.uk/contents/ 
151 See John W. Cairns, Scottish Law, Scottish Lawyers and the Status of the Union in John W. Cairns, Law, 
Lawyers and Humanism: Selected Essays on the History of Scots Law, Vol. I (Edinburgh: EUP, 2015), p.88 
152 See John W. Cairns, The Origins of the Glasgow Law School: The Professors of Civil Law, 1714–1761, in 
John W. Cairns, Enlightenment, Legal Education, and Critique: Selected Essays on the History of Scots Law, Vol. 
II (Edinburgh: EUP, 2015), p.148 
153 MacQueen, Introduction, p.vi 
154 MacQueen, Introduction, p.vi 
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elucidation of the law relevant to salters and colliers which is wholly absent from Stair’s 
account of Scots law. 
In common with the enlightenment thinkers of the 18th century, the title on Master and 
Servant in the Great Body begins by positing that ‘by the law of nature all men are free born’.155 
Like Stair and the Roman jurists, Forbes repeats the view that ‘slavery and bondage were 
introduced by the law of nations.’156 In his account, ‘servants’ are divided into three classes: 
‘slaves’, ‘hirelings’ and ‘apprentices’, though only ‘slaves are servants in the most proper 
sense’.157 It is implied that in Forbes’ schema slaves are ‘persons’, since he uses this term to 
describe that which might be sold or disposed of by the ‘master’.158 The assertion that ‘we have 
no vestige of slavery remaining in Scotland’, present in his Institutes,159 is echoed in the Great 
Body160 and, indeed, much of the discussion of the lot of colliers and salters mirrors that which 
is present in the shorter volume.161 
Of particular note in Forbes’ Great Body is the author’s suggestion that those who are 
slaves ‘in the rigid sense of the Roman law may come claim their freedom as soon as they come 
into France, Germany, the United Provinces [the Netherlands], England or Scotland’.162 This 
assertion must have been made at the very least twenty-six years before the English case of 
Somerset v Stewart163 tentatively endorsed this proposition164 and some thirty-two years before 
the case of Knight v Wedderburn165 unequivocally posited that this proposition is true within 
Scots law.166 The authority on which this proposition rests is, consequently, of particular 
interest. Forbes cites the English jurist Thomas Wood’s New Institute of the Civil Law as 
                                                          
155 Great Body, p.316 
156 Great Body, p.317 
157 Great Body, p.317 
158 Great Body, p.317: ‘the master may sell them, dispose of their persons, their industry and their labour’.  
159 Forbes, Institutes, p.91 
160 Great Body, p.321 
161 Compare Great Body, pp.321-322 and Forbes, Institutes, p.91 
162 Great Body, pp.320-321 
163 (1772) 98 ER 499 
164 Ibid, para.19 
165 (1788) Mor. 14545 
166 Ibid., p.14,546 
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authority for his proposition;167 Wood, for his part, states much the same as Forbes, though he 
omits mention of Scotland.168 
Wood’s New Institute was first published in 1704 and ran to four editions, with the last 
published in 1730.169 The third edition, which Forbes appears to have utilised,170 retains the 
unequivocal statement that ‘slaves may claim their freedom’ on arrival in England, Germany 
and France;171 the posthumously published fourth edition likewise provides the same statement, 
with the wording retained, and unaltered, from the first edition.172 Wood’s work has been the 
subject of little scholarly attention,173 however, during his lifetime (and for a considerable 
period thereafter) Wood’s ‘Institutes enjoyed considerable popularity in England and in the 
American colonies’.174 For that reason, it is perhaps surprising to find no reference to Wood’s 
work in Somerset v Stewart, though his second significant work, his Institute of the Laws of 
England, appeared in its 10th edition in that year,175 having first been published in 1720.176 
Unlike Wood’s Civil Institute, however, the Common law account provides no consideration 
of the subject of slavery, which perhaps explains why the court of King’s Bench felt no impetus 
to refer to the work, notwithstanding the extensive comparative consideration afforded to the 
position in other jurisdictions in the course of that judgment.177 
In any case, it appears that in both Scotland and in England there existed authority prior 
to – and post – the Treaty of Union which disavowed slavery as a legal institution.178 
Notwithstanding this jurisprudential hostility towards the juristic institution of slavery 
throughout the nascent United Kingdom, slavery retained de facto recognition within 
                                                          
167 Great Body, p.322 
168 Sir Thomas Wood, A New Institute of the Imperial, or Civil, Law, (London: Richard Sare, 1704), p.31 
169 Robert B. Robinson, The Two Institutes of Thomas Wood: A Study in Eighteenth Century Legal Scholarship, 
[1991] American Journal of Legal History 432, p.432 
170 Forbes’ reference to Wood directs the reader to page 40 of the work; this citation is not correct for the first 
edition, but is for the third.  
171 (3rd Edn) (London: Richard Sare, 1721), p.40 
172 (4th (London: J&J Knapton, 1730), p.114 
173 Robinson, The Two Institutes of Thomas Wood, p.433 
174 Robinson, The Two Institutes of Thomas Wood, p.432 
175 Sir Thomas Wood, An Institute of the Laws of England, (10th Edn.) (London: Strahan and Woodfall, 1772) 
176 Robinson, The Two Institutes of Thomas Wood, p.432 
177 The court refers to position in Scots law (noting that ‘the law of Scotland annuls the contract to serve to life’, 
save in the case of colliers and salters) and in French law (which is described in a manner consistent with the 
account of Wood and Forbes): Somerset v Stewart (1772) 98 ER 499, paras.4-5  
178 See also Allan and Mearns v Skene of Skene and Burnet of Monboddo (1722) Mor. 9454, wherein a contract 
of servitude for ‘three nineteen years’ was reduced, ‘being too great a restraint upon natural liberty’. 
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eighteenth century Scottish society.179 Indeed, it is evident that ‘slaves were a significant 
presence in eighteenth century Scotland, particularly from the 1740s onwards’.180 This fact of 
life stood seemingly at odds with the letter of the law, given the juridical hostility to the concept 
of ‘slavery’ expressed by the learned legal writers of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
century. 
This juridical hostility continued to be expressed in the Institutional writings published 
in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Lord Bankton’s Institute of the Laws of Scotland, 
which was modelled ‘after the general model of Stair’s Institutions’ and first published in 
1751,181 also expressed doubt on the existence of slavery as in institution in Scots law.182 Like 
Forbes’ publications, Bankton’s work appeared in the interregnum between the publication of 
the 2nd and 3rd editions of Stair’s opus. In discussing ‘the state and distinction of persons’,183 
Bankton unequivocally posits that ‘persons are all mankind’, though it is accepted that ‘the law 
considers them only with respect to rights, and their different state in that view.’184 Prima facie, 
in Bankton’s schema, it thus seems that though women, children and vassals might be afforded 
fewer civil rights than others, such does not imply any difference in the ‘personhood’ with 
which they are imbued by dint of their humanity.185 Such correlates with the 8th edition of 
Wood’s Common law Institute,186 which was published very soon after Bankton’s work. In any 
case, Bankton – like his forbearers – is explicit: ‘slavery, in a proper sense, does not take place 
with us’.187    
Nevertheless, Bankton acknowledges that ‘the state of colliers and salters, by our law 
and custom, resembles, in some respects, that of slaves [in the Roman sense]’,188 however it is 
stressed thereafter that the lot of colliers and salters is more readily comparable to that of 
adscriptitii.189 This comparison was also drawn by Erskine, who noted that colliers, salters and 
                                                          
179 Tom M. Devine, Recovering Scotland's Slavery Past, (Edinburgh: EUP, 2015), Ch.1, fn.19 
180 See Ross Crawford, Slaves and Slaveowners in Eighteenth-Century Scotland, [2012] Centre for Scottish and 
Celtic Studies accessible at http://cscs.academicblogs.co.uk/slaves-and-slaveowners-in-eighteenth-century-
scotland/ 
181 Andrew MacDouall, Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights: 
182 Bankton, Institute, I, 2, 80 
183 Bankton, Institute, I, 2 
184 Bankton, Institute, I, 2, 1 
185 Bankton, Institute, I, 2, 1 
186 Sir Thomas Wood, An Institute of the Laws of England, (8th Edn.)(London: Henry Lindtot, 1754), p.11 
187 Bankton, Institute, I, 2, 80 
188 Bankton, Institute, I, 2, 82 
189 Bankton, Institute, I, 2, 82 
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coal bearers were ‘by the law itself, without any paction, bound’ to the perpetual service of the 
mines.190  ‘Sturdy beggars’, ‘vagabonds’, ‘whores’ and ‘theives [sic]’ were, as a result of penal 
servitude, deprived of their liberty and ‘kept at hard work’191 and, along with colliers and 
‘indigent’ children, categorised as ‘necessary’ servants in Erskine’s schema.192 Like Forbes, 
then, Bankton and Erskine both recognised that Scots law recognised a status of ‘quasi-
slavery’;193 nevertheless, all were equally clear that Scotland (nor indeed any other ‘Christian 
country) did not countenance slavery.194 
Bankton and Erskine did, however, differ as to the legitimacy of perpetual servitude in 
the absence of any statute providing for such. Bankton discountenanced the notion as ‘against 
natural liberty’,195 whereas Erskine found that there was ‘nothing repugnant either to reason, 
or to the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, in a contract by which one binds himself to perpetual 
service under a master, who, on his part, is obliged to maintain the other in all the necessaries 
of life’.196 In support of this assertion, Erskine referred to the work of the Dutch jurist 
Grotius,197 making explicit his credentials as a natural lawyer.198 Bankton, on the other hand, 
founded his claim on positive Scots law, referring to the authority of the case of Allan and 
Mearns.199 Therein, it was found that the practice of astriction to the mines, and the ‘quasi-
slavery’ of those adscriptitii, was permissible only as a result of statutory authority. Thus, in 
the absence of any authorising statute, when a number of tacksmen contracted so as to astrict 
themselves, ‘as adscriptitii or villani’, to their fishing boats, the court reduced the contract on 
the grounds that such was an impermissible affront to liberty.200  
                                                          
190 John Erskine of Carnock, An Institute of the Law of Scotland, Vol.1 (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1773), Book I, Tit. 
VII, Ch.2, para.60 
191 Great Body, p.322; Erskine, Institute, I, 7, 2, 60 
192 Erskine, Institute, I, 7, 2, 60 
193 To use Forbes’ words: See Great Body, p.322 
194 Bankton, Institute, I, 2, 80; Erskine, Institute, I, 7, 2, 62. Erskine did, however, recognise the status of ‘negroes 
bought for the use of the European settlements in the Indies’ to be of ‘slavery’ in the proper sense. 
195 Bankton, Institute, I, 2, 83 
196 Erskine, Institute, I, 7, 2, 62 
197 Hugo de Groot (Grotius), De Iure Belli ac Pacis, (Amsterdam: Joannem Blaev, 1690),  2.c.5.27 
198 See Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), p.61. As MacCormick 
discusses, the Scottish Institutional writers were, to a man (and ironically, given their present status as sources of 
positive law) representatives of the ‘natural law’ school of legal thought. 
199 Allan and Mearns v Skene of Skene and Burnet of Monboddo (1722) Mor. 9454 
200 Ibid. 
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There was, however, one criminal case in which a Scottish court implicitly recognised 
that a Bengali girl was a ‘slave’, and not merely some kind of adscripta or other such servant.201 
As Professor Cairns notes, however, in that case ‘there was no discussion of the legality of that 
enslavement or of the nature of that slavery’.202 In a number of eighteenth century civil cases, 
culminating in Knight v Wedderburn, the question of the status of ‘slaves’ called before the 
Scottish courts;203 each of these cases included comparative discussion of Roman law and it is 
notable that the two ‘freedom cases’ (Sheddan and Dalrymple) were inconclusive due, in each 
case, to the deaths of one of the parties.204 
The litigants in Sheddan and Dalrymple each sought to test the proposition that a slave 
who was brought to Scotland was to be deemed free upon arrival. Though the court in Sheddan 
was generous enough to note that the ‘slave’ was ultimately to be deemed ‘free’ at the 
conclusion of that case, this was only because it was deemed death was sufficient to ‘free the 
servant from bondage’.205 Lord Kilkerran recorded that the Senators of the College of Justice 
were ‘generally inclined to find that the negro was not manumitted by his being brought to 
Scotland’,206 shedding some doubt upon Scots law’s formal institutional repudiation of the 
concept of slavery at the time of this case. In the case of Dalrymple, the ‘slave’ was ultimately 
deemed free, though only as a result of the death of the pursuer.207 Still, in defence, Spens – 
the defender – claimed that he was freed by his baptism as a Christian and that ‘by the Laws of 
this Christian land there is no Slavery nor vestige of Slavery allowed’.208 In spite of this, as the 
material concerning this case is rather fragmentary, it is difficult to discern what the court might 
                                                          
201 H.M Advocate v Bell or Belinda (1771) NRS JC23/193; NRS, JC11/28 
202 John W. Cairns, The Definition of Slavery in 18th Century Thinking, p.69 
203 Cairns identifies Robert Sheddan v A Negro (1757) Mor. 14545, Houston Stewart Nicholson v Mrs Stewart 
Nicholson (1770) Mor. 16770 and Dalrymple v Spens (1770) NRS CS236/D/4/3 as relevant pre-Knight cases 
concerning the definition of slavery as it was understood in the eighteenth century: See Cairns, The Definition of 
Slavery in 18th Century Thinking, pp.68-69 
204 Cairns, The Definition of Slavery in 18th Century Thinking, pp.69-70 
205 ‘Mors ultima linea rerum. There the servant shall be free from his master. The poor young man is dead, and so 
has put an end to the question, what influence Christian charity or love to our neighbour, whatever his colour is, 
ought to have.’: Robert Sheddan v A Negro (1757) Mor. 14545 
206 Ibid. 
207 This, of course, implies that Spens was not regarded as a ‘thing’ by Scots law. Had he been a slave ‘in a proper 
sense’, ownership of him would have logically fallen to Dalrymple’s heirs in line with the law of succession. 
208 Details of the Dalrymple v Spens litigation can be found on the National Archives of Scotland website: See 
https://webarchive.nrscotland.gov.uk/20170106030431/http://www.nas.gov.uk/about/061010.asp 
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have made of Spens’ argument and so nothing concrete can be concluded from the occurrence 
of this case.209 
Though the Institutional writers were explicit in their condemnation of slavery, ‘in the 
proper sense’,210 their sources were inconsistent as to the position of perpetual servitude in 
Scots law. Save Stair, who made no mention of those astricted to the mines, the Scottish jurists 
accepted that servitude for life was recognised where such was provided for by statute, each 
agreed that those placed in any form of legal servitude were ‘persons’ in the eyes of the law,211 
and manifestly not slaves, but were divided as to the criteria necessary to allow for one to be 
legitimately bound by law to labour for life (or for decades). This final point merits further 
discussion; as the arguments made by counsel in Stewart Nicholson v Stewart Nicholson 
indicates, the uncertain status of ‘servitude for life’ allowed scope for the question of a colonial 
slave’s ‘freedom’, in the Roman sense of slavery, to be, potentially, rendered moot.212 
(3) Slavery, Servitude and Astriction: A Distinction without a Difference? 
That the status of ‘servitude for life’ was potentially recognised as legally legitimate 
allowed for counsel to argue that a master of a colonial slave, in Scotland, did not possess the 
incidents of ‘ownership’ over the slave (at least for as long as the slave was outwith the 
jurisdiction of the colonies),213 but nevertheless retained a right to the services of his slaves. 
‘Jamaican slavery was very like the Roman, the essence being the type of possession or control 
associated with ownership’, but one who is bound to perpetual servitude ‘is in no real sense 
owned, just as the monarch did not own the sailors compelled by the press gang to serve in the 
Royal Navy’.214  This technical distinction between the status of slavery ‘in a proper sense’ and 
that of one of perpetual service might be thought merely pedantic; in practical terms, one can 
only imagine that informing an adscriptitii that he was not technically a ‘slave’ or the ‘property’ 
of his master would be of cold comfort if here were nevertheless expected to labour for life, for 
the benefit of his ‘master’, without the hope of improving his circumstances. 
                                                          
209 See the discussion in Cairns, The Definition of Slavery in 18th Century Thinking, p.70 
210 To paraphrase Bankton: Bankton, Institute, I, 2, 80 
211 As Cairns notes, the judges in Knight v Wedderburn must have ‘classified Knight as coming under the law 
relating to personae not that relating to res’ since ‘had they not done so, the Act of 1701 [the Liberation Act, or 
Act Anent Wrongous Imprisonment] would not have been applicable to him… because he had to be a ‘person’ to 
be covered by the provisions of the statute: See Cairns, The Definition of Slavery in 18th Century Thinking, p.81 
212 See Cairns, The Definition of Slavery in 18th Century Thinking, p.74 
213 Cairns, The Definition of Slavery in 18th Century Thinking, p.79 
214 Cairns, The Definition of Slavery in 18th Century Thinking, p.82 
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The courts and legal practitioners of the 18th century were alive to this fact; although 
this conception of ‘slavery’ did not adhere to the true ‘classic meaning of slavery as it has been 
practised for centuries’ (since the attendant powers possessed by the ‘master’ were lesser than 
those enjoyed by as Roman dominus), ultimately the courts came to hold that ‘perpetual 
service, without wages, is slavery’.215 Nevertheless, the ability to distinguish between the 
concept of Roman slavery, despotic in the letter of the law as well as in practice, and the lesser 
juristic concept of perpetual servitude, tyrannical in practice, though ostensibly more liberal 
than the explicitly repressive Romanistic regime, allowed those who were uncomfortable (for 
whatever reason) with the idea that one human being might ‘own’ another to equivocate on the 
issue of colonial slavery. Indeed, further to this, it allowed those who were explicitly in favour 
of the practical outcome of slavery to take public face against it without necessarily prejudicing 
their financial interests. Such occurred in the case of Knight v Wedderburn itself; in arguing 
for his entitlement to return his ‘servant’, Knight, to the colonies, Wedderburn’s counsel 
contended that ‘it is almost unfair even to quote the word slavery against [Wedderburn]’.216 
Though the Scottish institutional writers had each turned their faces against ‘slavery’ in its 
‘classical’ sense, since eminent jurists such as Stair and Erskine had explicitly enjoined the 
possibility of de facto slavery by recognising the legitimacy of contracts for perpetual service 
‘under whatever conditions were agreed, including service for necessaries without pay’.217 
Such allowed the Lord President (Dundas) to opine, along with Lord Elliock in Knight, that 
there was no moral or legal objection to the notion of perpetual, unwaged, servitude.218 
The Lord Justice-Clerk (Thomas Miller, then styled Lord Barskimming and later Lord 
Glenlee, with whom the majority agreed), however, rejected this notion; indeed, he was 
unequivocal in ruling that ‘the law of our land does not allow an express covenant, even of 
consent, for a servant to serve for life without wages’.219 In this, he implied a preference for 
both Bankton and precedent,220 as discussed above. Later editions of the respective Institutions 
                                                          
215 John S. More (Ed.), Stair’s Institutions of the Law of Scotland, Vol. I (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1832), 
p.19 
216 ALSP, Information for Joseph Knight, a Native of Africa, Pursuer in the Action at his Instance; Against John 
Wedderburn of Ballandean, Esq, Defender (25th April 1775), p.38 
217 Cairns, The Definition of Slavery in 18th Century Thinking, p.75 
218 Lord Hailes, Decisions of the Lords of Council and Session: From 1766 to 1791, Vol. II (Edinburgh: William 
Tait, 1826), pp.778-779. Lords Monboddo and Covington went further and took the view that Knight remained a 
slave in the Roman sense of that term. 
219 Hailes, Decisions, pp.778 
220 See supra. Neither Bankton nor Allan and Mearns are cited by the court, however. 
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of Stair and Erskine would retain the comments of the original authors endorsing the possibility 
of perpetual servitude falling short of ‘slavery’ in its classical sense, however each contained a 
proviso to the effect that such did not accurately represent the law of Scotland. More’s edition 
of Stair’s Institutes includes a footnote suggesting that liberty was ‘formerly’ an alienable 
right;221 Ivory’s edition of Erskine, for its part, notes that ‘it has [since] been absolutely decided, 
that a slave, brought from the plantations, acquires his freedom on coming to this country’,222 
with this proposition being justified by reference to Knight.  
The definition of ‘slavery’ was, then, understood to be broader in the late eighteenth 
century than it was in Roman law and, indeed, modern international law.223 With that said, 
however, for the status of ‘slavery’ to exist, there nevertheless required to be some legal 
recognition of the master-‘slave’ relationship. As counsel for Knight argued, ‘many have 
defined slavery to be a title to the industry of another; and this indeed is the essence of slavery, 
and whips, and chains, and tortures are only its attendants’.224 Arbitrary force might bring about 
de facto ‘slavery’, in a non-technical sense, but this status would not receive recognition in the 
courts. It would be no more than an unlawful detention, with the attendant cruelties and tortures 
being regarded as further and additional delicts.225 Thus, in the absence of ‘title’ (whether 
proprietary or contractual) allowing the ‘master’ some claim to the labour of the ‘slave’, the 
purported master would simply be regarded as a delinquent who had illegally affronted the 
personality interests of the person detained.226    
                                                          
221 More (Ed.), Stair’s Institutions, p.19 
222 See James Ivory (Ed.), Erskine’s Institute of the Law of Scotland, Vol. I (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1824), 
p.210 
223 See Jean Allain, The Legal Definition of Slavery in the Twenty-First Century, in The Legal Understanding of 
Slavery (2012), p.199 
224 ALSP, Information for Joseph Knight, a Native of Africa, Pursuer in the Action at his Instance; Against John 
Wedderburn of Ballandean, Esq, Defender (25th April 1775), p.38 
225 Or crime/delicts: See John Blackie and James Chalmers, Mixing and Matching in Scottish Delict and Crime, 
in Matthew Dyson, Comparing Tort and Crime: Learning from across and within Legal Systems, (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2015), p.286 
226 At common law, this affront might have been regarded as a crimen privati carceris, itself a nominate sub-
category of the iniuria realis (a species of the Romanistic delict iniuria, received into Scots law as the crime/delict 
‘injury’: See John Blackie, Unity in Diversity: The History of Personality Rights in Scots Law, in Niall R. Whitty 
and Reinhard Zimmermann, Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective (Dundee: DUP, 
2009), pp.111-113). Crimen privati carceris had fallen out of fashion by the latter half of the eighteenth century, 
since the Act 1701 (which remains in force today), and the remedy afforded for ‘wrongous imprisonment’ under 
this statute, came to be the preferred alternative for litigants: John Blackie, The Protection of Corpus in Modern 
and Early Modern Scots Law in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law. (Oxford: 
Hart, 2013), p.160. Knight, in his case, (successfully) relied upon the Act 1701 in his pleadings.  
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Since the legal condition of ‘slavery’ could not arise absent judicial recognition of either 
a ‘master’s’ exercise of dominium over his slave per the ‘classical’ definition, or of the 
lawfulness of unremunerated perpetual servitude per the eighteenth century conceptualisation, 
it would appear that the decision of the Court of Session in Knight rendered it wholly 
impossible for an individual to contravene the ‘slavery’ provision of s.4 in the 2015 Act. 
Certainly it can be concluded that the status of those astricted to the mines, or otherwise bound 
to labour for life, could well fall within the definition of ‘servitude’ within the context of the 
modern legislation, since such individuals were consistently recognised as juristic persons, 
though they were subject to the ‘particularly serious’ denial of liberty attached to the status of 
serfdom. In spite of this fact, however, due to the very recognition of their juridical 
‘personhood’, the astricted miner could not be described as a ‘slave’ within the terms of the 
legislation, as they were not ‘owned’ as is presently required by s.4. Indeed, even under the 
expansive later eighteenth century definition, the miners in question would not be ‘slaves’ as, 
though they were bound to labour in perpetuity, they were not unwaged and were, in fact, rather 
well remunerated for the work that they were bound to carry out.227  
An unwaged perpetual servant, though, would likewise not be recognised as a ‘slave’ 
under the 2015 Act, even in spite of the fact that the courts of the eighteenth century would 
have recognised this person’s condition of one of slavery (were the ‘master’ to hold claim to 
lawful title to the labour of the slave). Though the ‘slave’, in this context, is recognised as a 
‘person’ (P* and so potentially P2 within the context of the 2015 Act) and so ostensibly within 
the remit of s.4, the ‘master’ (P1) does not, here, hold genuine rights of ownership over P2. 
Thus, (I) – a necessary component for a conviction under the legislation – cannot be 
demonstrated and it becomes apparent that – though undoubtedly imperfect – the definition of 
‘slavery’ recognised by the Court of Session in the eighteenth century is, in fact, broader than 
that which now subsists in twenty-first century Scotland. In any case, s.4 remains of no utility 
to one kept in ‘slavery’ under either of these definitions, since all ‘slaves’ are instantly freed 
upon arriving in the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts and so their status or condition of 
‘slavery’ ceases to abide at that time. 
D.  ‘SLAVES’ IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
                                                          
227 See Christopher A. Whatley, Scottish 'Collier Serfs', British Coal Workers? Aspects of Scottish Collier Society 
in the Eighteenth Century, [1995] Labour History Review 66, passim.  
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The definition of ‘slavery’ has been settled as a matter of international law since the 
1926 Slavery Convention held that it was to be understood as ‘the status or condition of a 
person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the rights of ownership are 
exercised’.228 This rather narrow definition has, in part, served as a bulwark against the overly-
broad definitions of the term which began to proliferate throughout the twentieth century and 
led to worries that the word might be rendered effectively meaningless.229 Though the 
definition is perhaps commendable for this reason,230 there is still ‘no escaping the fact that the 
[Convention definition] emerged at the height of European imperialism qua colonialism’ and 
that it ‘was meant to be applicable, in the main, to the “Other” [i.e., only to those who were not 
members of the League of Nations]’.231 The Convention definition – received into European 
human rights law as it was – then serves as a means of penalising states which enjoin slavery, 
rather than as a means of protecting private persons from being maltreated or dehumanised by 
other private persons. 
While, then, as a matter of international law, the United Kingdom could be said to fail 
in its obligation under Article 4 of the ECHR if it permits one person to claim ownership of 
another within the context of any of the UK legal systems – and indeed, the Scottish Parliament 
would not be competent to introduce any law re-instituting slavery within its jurisdiction232 – 
it ultimately appears that Article 4, in these terms, does not provide direct protection to 
individuals who have been kept in ‘slavery’ by private persons. Protection for individuals who 
are enslaved de facto (as opposed to de iure) is afforded – as it was in the eighteenth century – 
by the common law of, and legislative enactments pertaining to, the protection of personality 
rights.233 One who holds another in a status analogous to slavery might be pursued, with 
considerable likelihood of success, in the civil courts and prosecuted for depriving a person of 
                                                          
228 See Holly Cullen, Contemporary International Legal Norms on Slavery, in The Legal Understanding of Slavery 
(2012), p.304 
229 See Jean Allain and Robin Hickey, Property and the Definition of Slavery, [2012] ICLQ 915, p.916; Suzanne 
Miers, Slavery in the 20th Century: The Evolution of a Global Problem, (AltaMira Press, 2003), p.453 
230 Indeed the International Research Network on Slavery as the Powers Attaching to the Rights of Ownership 
achieved a consensus that ‘the definition of slavery available within the existing international legal framework 
that provided the greatest clarity and usefulness was that given in the 1926 Slavery Convention’: See Kevin Bales, 
Slavery in Contemporary Manifestations, in The Legal Understanding of Slavery (2012), p.282 
231 Jean Allain, Slavery in the Twenty-First Century, p.199 
232 The Scottish Parliament is bound to comply with the ECHR by dint of s.57 of the Scotland Act 1998. Any 
legislation to legalise the ownership of human beings could consequently be struck down by the courts. 
233 Professor Reid has commented that ‘wrongful detention by private persons now occurs only rarely’ (see Elspeth 
C. Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, (W. Green, 2010), para.5.48) although it might 
be more accurate to simply state that cases concerning such now occur only rarely.  
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their liberty in the criminal courts.234 For slavery to be functionally criminalised as a nomen 
juris, as was intended with the passing of (what is now) s.4 of the 2015 Act, Parliament would 
have to pass legislation which paints the offence with a broader brush than the ECHR. At 
present, both international law and domestic Scots law bind the definition of ‘slavery’ to the 
existence of a legal institutional framework of ‘ownership’. This, as demonstrated, is a more 
restrictive definition than had begun to emerge in eighteenth century Scotland, which 
recognised that compelling another to perpetual servitude without wages was simply ‘slavery’, 
though this did not adhere to the ‘classical’ definition of that term. 
That the 1926 Convention applied a more restrictive definition of ‘slavery’ than that 
which had emerged in the eighteenth century is unsurprising. The Convention, though 
ostensibly humanitarian, was designed so as to serve the ‘political interests of the colonial 
powers amongst the original signatories to [it]’.235 By defining ‘slavery’ in the classical Roman 
sense, the European powers were able to ‘virtue-signal’ to the ‘uncivilised’ nations of the 
world, by condemning a practice which they themselves had proscribed. From the mid-
nineteenth century, the eradication of ‘slavery’, in this sense, in the ‘backward’ regions of the 
world had come to be viewed as an element of the ‘white man’s burden’ which resultantly 
justified further colonial expansion.236 By strictly confining the definition of ‘slavery’ to the 
understanding of that term as emerged from Roman law, colonialists were able to impose 
systems of labour which were as, or more, brutal than ‘slavery’, but which were not proscribed 
as they did not institutionally reify those subject to such regimes.237 
Although other international instruments, such as the United Nation’s Supplementary 
Convention in 1956,238 went further than the 1926 Convention in obliging signatories to 
abrogate serfdom, debt-bondage and other such conditions, the definition of ‘slavery’ remained 
unchanged in such instruments.239 The ECHR has continued in like vein, by co-opting the 
definition of ‘slavery’ as presented in the 1926 Convention without seeking to expand it beyond 
situations in which a nation-state institutes a legal regime in which certain human beings are 
                                                          
234 See Gerald H. Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland, Vol II, 4th edn (W. Green, 2017) by James Chalmers 
and Fiona Leverick, par.33.51 
235 Julia O’Connell-Davidson, Modern Slavery: The Margins of Freedom, (Palgrave-MacMillan, 2015), p.34 
236 O’Connell-Davidson, Modern Slavery, pp.32-33 
237 O’Connell-Davidson, Modern Slavery, p.33 
238 UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery 1956 
239 See Seymour Drescher, From Consensus to Consensus: Slavery in International Law, in The Legal 
Understanding of Slavery (2012), p.99  
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institutionally reified and recognised, as a matter of law, as being ‘owned’ by others. As an 
international instrument, this position is defensible, notwithstanding the problematic context in 
which the drafters of the 1926 Convention settled on the definition of ‘slavery’. At an 
international level, there ought to be a customary proscription of ‘slavery’ in the Roman sense; 
no state should be permitted to introduce (or re-introduce) such an abomination within its 
national law.240 With that said, however, ‘modern slavery’, which the 2015 Act (and the 
equivalent legislation in England and Wales) seeks to proscribe, is a phenomenon which is 
evidently distinct from both Roman slavery and the slavery of the Americas and European 
colonies. As O’Connell-Davidson observed, ‘the legalistic approach to the definition of slavery 
worked perfectly well for anti-slavery campaigners prior to the abolition of chattel slavery’,241 
but ‘in a post-abolition world no one can “be” a slave in the strictest nineteenth-century sense 
of occupying a legally recognised status category of person as property’.242  Accordingly, in 
constructing a legal definition of ‘slavery’ in domestic law, national legislatures must recognise 
the limitations of the present definition which subsists in international law. 
In recognition of this fact, it is here submitted that the rights set out in the ECHR should 
not be regarded as the ‘gold standard’ of rights which might be afforded by law; rather, those 
rights should be properly viewed as the minimum standard of rights which a legal system should 
be expected to uphold. Indeed, as Lord Bingham observed in the 2004 case of R v Special 
Adjudicator ex parte Ullah, ‘the duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less’.243 In like vein, it might 
be said that it is the duty of national legislatures to go beyond the letter of the Convention in 
implementing legislation to protect the human rights and interests of all in society.244 As such, 
rather than taking the ECHR definition of ‘slavery’ as the starting point, the Scottish Parliament 
should instead take time to consider the precise nature of the harm that it wishes to criminalise 
by legislation of this kind. In doing so, it should be plain to see that the harm caused by modern 
                                                          
240 Note that as interwar Germany was a signatory to the 1926 Convention, the Nazi leadership was in contempt 
of international law and consequently the Reich’s leadership was charged with, and convicted of, crimes against 
humanity for its institutional re-introduction of Romanistic slavery in Nazi Germany: See Seymour Drescher, 
From Consensus to Consensus: Slavery in International Law in The Legal Understanding of Slavery (2012), p.100 
241 O’Connell-Davidson, Modern Slavery, p.32 
242 Rebecca J. Scott, Under Color of Law: Siliadin v. France and the Dynamics of Enslavement in in Historical 
Perspectives, in The Legal Understanding of Slavery (2012), p.162 
243 [2004] UKHL 26, para.20 
244 It is worth noting, at this juncture, that per s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the courts may be bound to have 
due regard to the ECHR in any case concerning s.4 of the 2015 Act even in the absence of subsection (2), since 
the courts cannot presently ‘act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right’. 
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slavery is not the same as that perpetrated by the Romans, or by European colonial ventures, 
but rather that it is a harm of an altogether more insidious kind. Such requires the legislature to 
consider, in detail, the nature of the wrong which it seeks to proscribe before ultimately coming 
up with its own definition of the term ‘slavery’, in order to ensure that the particular wrong is 
indeed thus prohibited. A necessary element of this, it is thought, is the de-coupling of the 
understanding of ‘modern slavery’ from the ‘classical’ definition which remains fundamentally 
predicated upon the existence of a legal regime allowing ‘ownership’ of human beings. 
As Bales notes, ‘slavery is, first and foremost, a state of being – not a legal 
definition’.245 To tackle the issue of ‘modern slavery’, however, some kind of legal definition 
is required. Although it might be contended that the horrors of colonialism are such that the 
term ‘slavery’ should not be diluted by expanding to include situations other than those in 
which there is anything less than an institutional denial of the personhood of human beings,246 
if any legislative provision akin to s.4 of the 2015 Act is to have any legal effect, and not serve 
as mere headline-grabbing window-dressing, the definition of ‘slavery’ must expand beyond 
the limited, ‘classical’, sense in which it is used in international law. Indeed, to be effective, 
any such definition must be decoupled not only from questions of ‘ownership’, but from wider 
questions of legal title, as the situation in respect of the eighteenth century Scottish conception 
of ‘slavery’ makes clear. If, in order to prove that a ‘person’ held another in ‘slavery’, one must 
prove that the law recognises some lawful relationship between those persons, the prohibition 
becomes, axiomatically, oxymoronic. For that reason, it is here submitted that the definition of 
‘slavery’, within the terms of the 2015 Act, might be more effective if it were understood to 
amount to the occurrence of a situation in which, through their actions in depriving another 
person of their liberty, a person purports to hold another person as their ‘property’, treating 
them as though they held the status of ‘slave’, or otherwise purports to exercise rights of 
ownership over that person. 
It is not here suggested that the above amounts to an ideal definition of ‘slavery’. It is 
simply posited that acceptance of this definition – or one like it – would avoid the issues, which 
have been identified in the course of this article, attached to the present definition in 
international and domestic Scots law as it stands. Under such a definition, there would be no 
                                                          
245 Professor Kevin Bales’s Response to Professor Orlando Patterson, in The Legal Understanding of Slavery 
(2012), p.360 
246 As O’Connell-Davidson notes, ‘in practice anti-slavery advocacy has largely framed slavery as a uniquely 
appalling phenomenon’ (present author’s emphasis): See Modern Slavery, p.31  
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need to prove that there existed any recognised legal relationship between the ‘master’ and 
‘slave’; likewise, that the law recognises the ‘slave’ as a ‘person’ would not be problematic, 
since the proposed definition would not require there to be a juridical denial of the ‘slaves’ 
‘personhood’, as is presently required. What is key, to any legal definition of ‘slavery’ in 
national law, is that the practical reality of the ‘slave’s’ experience should be placed at the 
centre of that definition. As Patterson recognised, slavery is characterised by ‘the absolute 
power (in practice) [present author’s emphasis] of the master over his slave, the latter becoming 
merely an extension of the will and household of the former’ as well as ‘the deracination and 
socio-cultural isolation of the slave’.247 Such can be practically demonstrated in the absence of 
any institutional or legal recognition of the relationship between ‘master’ and ‘slave’:248 By 
emphasising that a simulacrum of ‘ownership’, rather than actual legal ownership, will suffice 
to establish ‘slavery’, as is suggested here, the courts would not be bound to hold that ‘the 
definition of slavery involves … rights of ownership’  and thus that ‘there was no evidence 
[and could not possibly be evidence] upon which they could hold that the complainer had been 
held in a state of slavery’, as was found to be the case in Miller.  
In any case, whether the author’s proposed definition is deemed acceptable or not, it is 
clear that, presently, the definition of ‘slavery’ contained within the 2015 Act is not fit for 
purpose. Within the terms of the legislation as it presently stands, it is not possible for a court 
to ever convict anyone who is charged with holding another human being as a slave. Such is 
made clear by the decision of the court in Miller; due to the letter of the law as set out in the 
2015 Act, the court had no choice but to link the concept of slavery to the legal conception of 
‘ownership’. Since Scots property law remains rooted in Roman jurisprudence, there was no 
scope for the courts to make use of a purposive interpretation of the 2015 Act – the ‘definition 
of slavery… involves rights of ownership’ and, since Scots law knows of a defined concept of 
‘ownership’, there could be no evidence that the accused therein held another ‘person’ as a 
slave. As such, when the time comes for Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 
2015 to be reviewed, it is plain that the legislature must do more to ensure that the wrong which 
they wish to proscribe is adequately defined within any subsequent legislation. The first step 
to take in this process is clearly the decoupling of the domestic law definition of ‘slavery’ from 
                                                          
247 Orlando Patterson, Trafficking, Gender and Slavery: Past and Present, in The Legal Understanding of Slavery 
(2012), p.323 
248 As Bales notes, It is clear that ‘for most forms of slavery, the fundamental powers of ownership are exactly 
those that can be determined to exist outside legal frameworks’: see Kevin Bales, Slavery in Contemporary 
Manifestations, in The Legal Understanding of Slavery (2012), p.284 
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the understanding of that term that has emerged in international law and international legal 
instruments. 
E. CONCLUSION 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the 2019 case of Miller v HM Advocate has 
laid bare a notable problem with s.4 of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 
2015. If slavery involves, necessarily, one human being ‘being in the legal ownership of 
another’,249 then the crime of slavery cannot occur in any jurisdiction which does not juridically 
recognise the possibility of legal ownership of human beings. Though Scotland, like most 
European jurisdictions, recognised the status or condition of agrarian serfdom, this institution 
died out at a relatively early stage in the development of Scots law. In any case, given the 
narrowness of the ‘classical’ definition of slavery, these serfs were manifestly not slaves. 
Though some modern writers have described the condition of colliers and salters as akin to 
slavery, it appears that their lot was closer in juridical nature to serfdom. Thus, those 
individuals astricted to the mines were not ‘slaves’ within either the ‘classical’ meaning of 
slavery as it subsisted in Roman law (and, indeed, in modern international law), since the 
miners were both juristically recognised as ‘persons’ and remunerated for their labour.    
Although the Scottish academic and institutional writers of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century were hostile to the institution of slavery, and consistently expressed the view 
that ‘we have no vestige of slavery remaining in Scotland’, as a result of the UK’s colonial 
ventures (in which many prominent Scots were enthusiastic participants) slavery was 
something of a fact of life in eighteenth century Scotland. Nevertheless, the question of whether 
or not individuals were lawfully owned or held in slavery, in Scotland, was undecided until the 
1778 case of Knight v Wedderburn unequivocally held not only that Scots law did not recognise 
the institution of slavery in its Roman sense, but also that that ‘the law of our land does not 
allow an express covenant, even of consent, for a servant to serve for life without wages’. This 
recognition that ‘perpetual service, without wages, is slavery’ meant that Scots law, since this 
time, has unequivocally refused to recognise the legal validity of any relationship akin to 
‘slavery’ in an extended sense and so any individual who is held as a slave in another 
jurisdiction becomes free upon arrival in Scotland.  
                                                          
249 Miller, para.17 (present author’s emphasis). 
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As a result of this, it is presently impossible for a private individual to engage in conduct 
which might see them convicted of a charge of ‘slavery’ under s.4 of the 2015 Act. Any 
individual who obtains ‘ownership’ of a human being in a jurisdiction other than Scotland 
would cease to enjoy ownership of their slave upon reaching the jurisdiction of the Scottish 
courts. Although this slave-owner might be liable for any number of delicts, and could be 
criminally liable for depriving another person of their liberty, were they to continue to act as 
‘master’ of another human being, the nomen juris of slavery would not attach to conduct of this 
kind at present. As it stands, the definition of ‘slavery’ – as it subsists in international and 
European human rights law, and so by association s.4 of the 2015 Act – serves as a means of 
obliging states to refrain from instituting a legal order which recognises the legal validity of 
ownership of human beings. 
If the Scottish government wishes to afford prosecutors the means to try cases involving 
‘human trafficking’ or ‘modern slavery’ as ‘slavery’ in any nominate sense, the definition of 
the term ‘slavery’, within the context of the present legislation, must be revised. This paper 
makes no pretence to proffer the perfect definition of ‘slavery’ fit for the challenges we face in 
the modern world. The definition suggested in this article is simply indicative of one way in 
which the law might progress, if it is to effectively criminalise modern slavery, as the 2015 Act 
intended. Whatever weight is attached to the suggestion that ‘purporting’ to exercise ownership 
over another ought to amount to ‘slavery’, the primary submission of the present piece simply 
remains a request that, when the time comes for the Scottish Parliament to review s.4 of the 
2015 Act, our legislators take seriously the task which is before them and go beyond the 
confines of the unfit ‘classical’ – and ultimately regressive – definition of the term which exists 
as the present norm in international law.  
